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Abstract—Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provides a
trusted execution environment (TEE) to run code and operate
sensitive data. SGX provides runtime hardware protection where
both code and data are protected even if other code components
are malicious. However, recently many attacks targeting SGX
have been identified and introduced that can thwart the hardware
defence provided by SGX. In this paper we present a survey
of all attacks specifically targeting Intel SGX that are known
to the authors, to date. We categorized the attacks based on
their implementation details into 7 different categories. We also
look into the available defence mechanisms against identified
attacks and categorize the available types of mitigations for each
presented attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) create isolated en-
vironments where sensitive code can run with higher security
level than the operating system. Intel Software Guard Exten-
sions (SGX) is an example of a TEE. SGX utilizes enclaves
to isolate execution environment from other applications, the
operating system’s kernel and the hypervisor. SGX can run
arbitrary code on general hardware and is suitable for cloud
environments where it isolates the running code and data from
the untrusted environment.
Without TEE solutions such as SGX, virtualization tech-
niques are the primary defence that can be used by software
to isolate code and data from other running software on a
computer. Unfortunately virtualization techniques requires the
application to trust the OS-kernel and hypervisor, and by
extension the cloud provider in such a scenario.
SGX is only one of a few attempts at solving the issue
of trusted computing in the cloud. Another solution is the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The TPM however requires
a larger chain of trust which is a drawback since it would
require that the user roots its trust in the both the intentions
of the implementers and in the absence of bugs in very large
pieces of code (often including the BIOS’, the OS kernel’s
and hypervisor’s code-bases). Comparatively, SGX provides a
great advantage, in that the root of trust is based only on the
application code itself and the hardware implementation of the
CPU.
This work was partially supported by the Wallenberg AI, Autonomous
Systems and Software Program (WASP) funded by the Knut and Alice
Wallenberg Foundation
Unfortunately, a relatively large number of flaws and attacks
against SGX have been published by researchers over the last
few years.
A. Contribution
In this paper, we present the first comprehensive review
that includes all known attacks specific to SGX, including
controlled channel attacks, cache-attacks, speculative execu-
tion attacks, branch prediction attacks, rogue data cache loads,
microarchitectural data sampling and software-based fault in-
jection attacks. For most of the presented attacks, there are
countermeasures and mitigations that have been deployed as
microcode patches by Intel or that can be employed by the
application developer herself to make the attack more difficult
(or impossible) to exploit. For all of the surveyed attacks in
this paper, any known and relevant mitigation techniques are
also presented.
B. Organization
In sec. II some background information on SGX is pre-
sented. The known attacks with their categorizations are given
in sec. III. Then, the available mitigation techniques to catego-
rized attacks are given in sec. IV. Finally, the current status of
mitigation techniques and their applicability against specific
attacks are discussed in sec. V and the paper is concluded in
sec. VI.
II. BACKGROUND ON SGX
SGX is a set of extensions that aim to provide integrity and
confidentiality for secure computations on computer systems
where privileged software is potentially malicious.
SGX provides execution environments called enclaves to
run code and operate sensitive data, where both code and
data are protected from the outside software environment. This
includes other applications running on the system and the
operating system’s kernel. Even the hypervisor, if it is running,
is an actor from which SGX enclaves are protected. Notably,
physical attacks are not considered in Intel’s threat model, nor
are so-called side-channel attacks.
For the rest of this section we refer to [1] without explicitly
writing it out on each paragraph. We refer to it also for the
interested reader who wishes a more detailed explanation on
the internals of SGX.
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2A. SGX Overview
The Intel x86 64-bit instruction set architecture (ISA),
to which we limit the scope of this paper, defines several
architectural privilege levels, each one strictly more capable
than the one below it. The least privileged is ring 3 where
all user-space applications run. This is the majority of the
software on a running system1. Ignoring ring 2 and 1, which
are not used by any major Operating System today, the next-
most powerful privilege level is ring 0 in which the OS
kernel is running. Software running in ring 0 is responsible
for resource allocation, device management, context switching,
page swapping and so forth.
Intel Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX) is a set of hard-
ware virtualization instructions which introduces the additional
privilege levels of VMX root and VMX non-root. Hypervisors
usually run as VMX root in ring 0 and carry the ultimate
responsibility of resource allocation.
This relates to Intel SGX in the following way: An SGX
enclave always runs as ring 3 like any normal user-space
application (either VMX root or non-root). Also like any
normal user-space application it relies on the OS-kernel (ring
0) software for services such as scheduling, page swapping
and hardware interrupt handling. This is despite the fact that
none of the system software (ring 3 or 0) is trusted by the
enclave threat model. This has been achieved by a rather
complex series of hardware extensions as well as the exclusion
of denial-of-service from the threat model. This is reasonable
since protection against denial of service in an untrusted
environment would be very hard to achieve, if not down-right
impossible.
The code and data for all enclaves on a running system
resides in the Enclave Page Cache (EPC) inside the Processor
Reserved Memory (PRM) which is a reserved subset of the
physical address space (DRAM). It is worth noting that this
address range is protected by the CPU so that Direct Memory
Access (DMA) is prohibited and that not even code running
in the so-called Software Management Mode2 can get access
to its contents. In order to protect against snoops of external
memory reads and writes the PRM is transparently encrypted
and integrity protected before entering/exiting the memory bus.
This means that the CPU package itself is the only place where
enclave data can be read in its decrypted form.
Enclaves are designed to operate much like dynamic load-
able modules3 which are loaded directly into the virtual
address space of user-space applications. This means that
enclaves can be entered in much the same ways that API-
calls are made into software libraries (although it is a more
expensive operation). This makes it comparatively easy to
modify existing programs.
Enclaves can only be entered at well defined entry points
(much like a library API) as specified by the enclave author.
1This includes large parts of the OS as well, where the kernel is the obvious
exception.
2An even higher privilege level than ring 0 and VMX-root, used solely
by the motherboard firmware to manage, for example, the booting stage, fan
control, power and sleep functions.
3Such as .dll files for PE and Windows based systems and .so files for
ELF and Unix derived systems.
This prevents memory mapping attacks and security check
bypasses. While application software cannot access the mem-
ory space of the enclave the reverse is not true. The enclave
have no restrictions in regards to the rest of the applications
code and data, this facilitates easy and secure communication
between the two modes.
The SGX design and implementation is fully backward
compatible with other ISA extensions such as VMX which
enables the use of this technology by cloud tenants where
several virtual machines are co-hosted on the same hardware.
B. The SGX Lifetime
The enclave’s lifetime is managed by the (untrusted) OS-
kernel, this includes handling of page swapping, interrupts
and CPU core scheduling. This is facilitated by several new
instructions introduced by the SGX extensions. Some of the
more important ones will be discussed in this section.
1) Creation: In order to create an enclave, ring 0 first issues
the privileged ECREATE instruction. Enclave creation is
intended as a service for applications, provided by the system
software. The ECREATE instruction allocates a special page
for the enclave called the SECS, like all other enclave pages it
is located inside the protected PRM range. The SECS stores
meta data for the enclave and it is critical for the enclave’s
security.
2) Loading: After creation the SECS is still marked as
uninitialized. Only while the SECS is marked as such can
EADD and EEXTEND instructions be issued for that enclave.
These instructions are also privileged and can only be issued
by ring 0. EADD is used to add pages into the protected virtual
address space of the enclave.
EEXTEND is used for measuring data and code for
software attestation. Attestation will be briefly discussed in
sec. II-C.
3) Initialization: The OS-kernel in ring 0 must issue the
EINIT instruction in order to initialize the enclave. However,
before it can do that it must first obtain an EINIT Token
Structure. The procedure for this is to utilize a special Launch
Enclave (LE) which is signed by a special key whose corre-
sponding public part is hardcoded into the SGX implementa-
tion by Intel.
4) Teardown: Ring 0 can issue the EREMOVE instruction
to remove enclaves. This deallocates the specified page after
it is made sure that no logical processor currently owns it.
After the SECS page is deallocated the enclave is completely
destroyed. EREMOVE refuses to deallocate the SECS before
all other pages have been deallocated.
5) Synchronous Entry: Each logical processor executing the
enclave code uses a Thread Control Structure (TCS) which
controls the execution and makes sure that no two processors
use the same TCS at the same time.
Disregarding the possibility of interrupts an enclave is
executed as a controlled jump into the enclave’s code by
issuing the EENTER instruction. EENTER can only jump to
predefined addresses which prevents a malicious host appli-
cation from bypassing security checks that the enclave author
might wish to perform. When entering enclave mode some
3registers are saved in order to be restored later when the
enclave is done executing. While executing enclave code, the
logical processor is said to be in enclave mode.
6) Synchronous Exit: One of two ways of exiting enclave
mode is via the EEXIT instruction which additionally performs
a restore of the registers saved by EENTER.
7) Asynchronous Exit: If a hardware exception occurs, such
as an interrupt or fault while a logical processor is executing
enclave code an AEX instruction is issued by the enclave
before invoking the system software’s default exception han-
dler. This instruction saves the current execution context and
restores the state saved by EENTER.
8) Resumption: Once the registered software handler for a
hardware interrupt has finished, it jumps back to the asyn-
chronous exit handler in the enclaves host’s process. This
handler is responsible for issuing the ERESUME instruction
which puts the logical processor back into enclave mode which
continues the execution which was interrupted.
9) Page Eviction and Reloading: The SGX eviction imple-
mentation relies on the privileged EWB instruction (restricted
to ring 0) which encrypts and integrity protects the specified
page with a symmetric key known only to the enclave. It also
utilizes a mechanism for ensuring freshness, based on nonces.
After the EWB instruction has evicted the PRM page, the
system’s default page-swapping mechanism can take over and
flush the page to disk, if desired.
C. Software Attestation
The goal of software attestation is to verify that the software
application running inside an enclave is trustworthy. This
verification can be done by using a remote party. Attestation
data within the software can be signed by requesting the SGX
hardware implementation to generate an attestation signature.
The signature can be used to uniquely identify the software
and any optional data inside the enclave. The verifier can
use the signature to make sure that the attestation data was
generated by a specific software running on a genuine SGX
implementation.
III. ATTACKS ON SGX
We found a large group of attacks on SGX (most of them
side-channel based) and using their implementation details,
we divide them into 7 different categories. The categories and
the attacks in each category are described below. The surveyed
papers are mostly self-categorized, we have simply unified the
most common terminology based on their technical details. A
summary of the attacks presented in this section is provided
in Table I.
Attacks that are out-of-scope: As mentioned, we consider
denial-of-service attacks to be out-of-scope. Due to this we do
not include for example attacks such as SGX-Bomb [2], where
the CPU can be forced to shutdown due to a hardware bug
called RowHammer [3], [4].
The security of SGX enclaves can be undermined if enclaves
do not take care to strictly adhere to an agreed-upon secure
interface between the trusted and untrusted code bases. To
help facilitate this, a number of SDKs are available, to aid
the construction of secure enclaves. In particular they help
out with, for example, CPU status flag sanitation, correct
stack pointer restoration, range checks of pointers and arrays
and prevention of register leakage on exit. Of course, any
vulnerability in the SDK itself will automatically impact all
enclaves that make use of it. In “A Tale of Two Worlds” [5]
Van Bulck et al. discovered multiple vulnerabilities in all open
source SDKs for enclave development that they tested. This
paper do not invalidate the security properties of SGX in and of
itself, but it highlights the difficulty in writing secure software
in general and enclaves in particular.
Another class of attacks are those that targets specific
vulnerabilities of the enclave developer’s own implementation.
We mention a few such attacks here, for the readers conve-
nience, but the list is by no means complete.
Checkoway and Shacham proposed the Iago attack [6].
The authors proposed to take advantage of the implicit trust
applications place on the kernel, despite it being explicitly
stated to exist outside the TCB. Conceptually the Iago attack
uses a malicious OS-kernel to send false responses to system
calls in order to fool the application under attack to perform
operations against its own interests.
Lee et al. evaluated the old attack technique “Return-
Oriented Programming” (ROP) in [7] and found that it is in-
deed possible to circumvent the hardware protections provided
by the SGX design and achieve a total security break of the
attacked enclave.
An attack was also introduced by Weichbrodt et al. [8]
which exploits synchronization bugs in multi-threaded SGX
enclaves. The authors built an attack tool called “AsyncShock”
which simplifies the reliable exploitation of such bugs in
enclave code.
A. Controlled Channel Attacks [9]–[14]
This section introduces the notion of controlled channel
attacks, a term that Xu et al. [9] coined in 2015. It is a type
of side-channel attack that make use of the near-total control
the untrusted OS-kernel has over the platform. This control
can be used to construct powerful side channels against the
protected enclave who relies on the kernel’s services. There
have been several more attacks, based on the same principles.
The strategy used in [9], [10] was to monitor memory
accesses with page-level granularity by monitoring or intro-
ducing page-faults. SGX-Step [11] instead configures APIC
timers, issues interrupts and tracks page-table entries in such
a way that it allows for single-stepping enclave code instruc-
tions.
SGX-Step is also used as a framework in many other attacks
(see [5], [12], [13], [28], [34], [44]).
In [12] a timing-based side channel with instruction-level
granularity is achieved by timing carefully synchronized inter-
rupts while the enclave is running. The authors in [13] propose
a side channel by exploiting the memory segmentation feature
only available for code running in the 32-bit legacy mode.
Wang et al. proposed a new attack called sneaky page
monitoring [14] which does not require any interrupts of the
enclave by periodically accessing and resetting the accessed
flag in the translation lookaside buffer, TLB.
4B. Cache-attacks [20]–[25]
There have been many cache-based timing attacks against
SGX enclaves published in the literature. Common to all of
them are the exploitation of the cache-hierarchy system and
the fact that the caching of memory loads from DRAM leaves
effects in the system state which are measurable from outside
the protected application. What these attacks show is that SGX
enclaves are vulnerable to the same cache attacks against secret
dependent information processing as any software application.
In-fact they appear to be even more vulnerable due to the
increased capability of the attackers in SGX’s attack model.
There exist a number of different general (non SGX-
specific) techniques for extracting information from side chan-
nels, we mention here Flush+Reload [15], Prime+Probe [16],
Evict+Time [17], Evict+Reload [18] and Flush+Flush [19].
In the sneaky page monitoring4 Wang et al. [14] explores
several different ways of improving their attack. The authors
particularly makes use of the Prime+Probe cache timing
technique to increase the granularity of their attack.
The CacheZoom attack [20], introduced by Moghimi et
al. also makes use of the Prime+Probe technique, as does
Go¨tzfried et al. [21] in their attack. Schwarz et al. [22]
construct a malicious enclave from which they mount a
Prime+Probe attack against other enclaves. Brasser et al. pro-
posed a same-core attack (using HT) against the L1 cache [23],
also using Prime+Probe. Prime+Probe is again used by Dall
et al. [24] to attack Intel’s provisioning enclave and thereby
allows Intel themselves to break EPID’s5 unlinkability prop-
erty.
The MemJam [25] attack by Moghimi et al. uses read-after-
write false dependencies due to the 4K aliasing of the L1
cache. The methodology itself resembles that of Evict+Time.
C. Branch Prediction Attacks [26]–[28]
Lee et al. introduced the Branch Shadowing attack in [26]
to reveal fine-grained control flow of a running SGX enclave,
they showed that this could be used to break the security of
several enclave-based constructs. In [27] Evtyushkin et al. pro-
posed a similar attack, dubbed BranchScope, which uses the
directional branch predictor instead of the BTB (branch target
buffer) which is a companion component to the BTB. This
shows that the branch predictor unit can be vulnerable even
in the face of BTB protections. Bluethunder [28] is another
branch predictor attack similar to BranchScope. The main
difference of Bluethunder to BranchScope is that Bluethunder
uses a 2-level directional predictor which is a completely
different branch predictor unit. As a result Bluethunder is 52
times faster than BranchScope.
D. Speculative Execution Attacks [31]–[33]
Early 2018 the Spectre [29] and Meltdown [30] attacks
made headlines outside the academic world. In this section,
the Spectre attack in particular is of interest. This attack
4The basic attack is a controlled channel attack, see sec. III-A.
5EPID or Enhanced Privacy ID is Intel’s recommended algorithm used for
attestation while preserving privacy of the trusted system
originally had 2 variants: bounds check bypass and branch
target injection. The second variant targets the BTB, branch
target buffer, in such a way that when the victim process
executes an indirect branch instruction it mispredicts and spec-
ulatively executes code that never would have been executed.
Of course, once the CPU-pipeline catches up and realizes
that it was a misprediction it discards any results. Central to
the Spectre attack however, is the hardware vulnerability that
these speculatively executed instructions results in measurable
changes to the CPU state, or in this case the CPU cache. In
short, the Spectre attack allows an attacking process to infer
some data values from vulnerable co-hosted processes.
In [31] Chen et al. answered the question of whether or not
SGX is vulnerable to the Spectre or Spectre-like attacks in
the affirmative. The authors presented the SgxPectre attack
and used it to extract the secret seal keys and attestation
keys from Intel signed quoting enclaves. In [32] Koruyeh et
al. proposed the SpectreRSB attack which alternatively uses
the return stack buffer which is a structure in modern CPUs
used to speculatively predict the return address of execution
frames (functions). SgxSpectre in [33] (not to be confused with
SgxPectre [31]) also demonstrated a successful attack on SGX
enclaves using a slight modification of the Spectre variant 1
attack.
E. Rogue Data Cache Loads [34]
Similarly to the Spectre-type of attacks Meltdown [30]
exploits the out-of-order execution of modern CPUs. Unlike
Spectre however, Meltdown does not explicitly make use of
the speculative execution feature or the BTB, instead it relies
on a race condition where the results of unauthorized memory
accesses are transiently available for out-of-order executed
instructions before the CPU issues a fault and rolls-back the
results of these instructions. This implicitly affects the CPU
cache and allows the memory access to be inferred.
SGX however, works slightly differently in that it does not
issue any faults for accessing enclave memory, but instead
uses abort page semantics [1] which allows the access with a
dummy -1 result. The Foreshadow attack [34] works around
this lack of race condition by instead relying on the fact that
the abort page semantics applies only after normal page-table
based permission checks succeeds without issuing a page-fault.
Foreshadow therefore revokes all access to the enclave pages
that it wishes to read using the mprotect system call, after
this the principle of the Meltdown approach can again be used.
Due to details of the SGX implementation this only works for
memory which has been already cached in the first level cache
(L1), Intel therefore categorized the Foreshadow vulnerability
as a “L1 Terminal Fault” (L1TF) bug. [34]
In Foreshadow-NG [35] the authors generalize the L1TF
attack into three versions: Foreshadow-SGX (original Fore-
shadow attack), Foreshadow-OS and Foreshadow-VMM.
These attacks were also used in [36]. The latter 2 attacks were
also discovered by Intel and are not applicable to SGX.
F. Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) [38]–[41]
In late 2019 three papers of similar nature were published,
namely Fallout [37], RIDL [38] and ZombieLoad [39]. Intel
5has dubbed this new class of attacks Microarchitectural Data
Sampling attacks, or MDS-attacks and they can be used
to bypass most of the common security boundaries, such
as: JavaScript sandboxes, processes, kernels, VMs and SGX
enclaves. Although similar in nature to both Spectre and
Meltdown, due to their use of out-of-order and speculative
execution features they have another common theme; these
works are based upon leakage of information from a number
of implementation specific and undocumented intermediary
buffers of the targeted micro architecture. Closely following
these original papers CacheOut [40] CrossTalk [41] and SX-
Axe [42] were published in the first half of 2020.
Fallout, for example, makes use of the store buffer to leak
information of kernel writes to user space. Luckily, due to the
flushing of the store buffer, SGX is safe from this particular
attack. Unluckily, SGX still falls victim to the other attacks
mentioned in the above paragraph.
RIDL, or Rogue In-Flight Data Load, and CacheOut both
exploit the Line Fill Buffers (LFBs) to the effect of bypassing
all — at their respective time of publication — deployed
mitigations for Spectre, Meltdown and Foreshadow. The LFBs
are used in the transfer paths between the L1 data caches
(L1D) and the L2 caches. RIDL was the first work to criti-
cally analyse the behaviour of the LFBs from a MDS-attack
perspective.
ZombieLoad also targets the LFBs6, as the name suggests
however, it leaks whatever stale data currently resides in
the buffers. ZombieLoad is an improvement in that while
RIDL only leaks data from loads not currently residing in the
L1D cache, ZombieLoad leaks the results of memory loads,
regardless of the requested data’s presence in L1D or not.
Both RIDL and ZombieLoad suffer from a “drinking from
a firehose” [40] problem, in that they are unable to control
which data is loaded into the LFBs and subsequently leaked.
CacheOut later solved this problem by forcing contention
on the L1D data it wishes to target, and thereby evicting it
(through the LFBs) from the cache.
SGAxe [42] is not a new attack, per se, but it utilized
the CacheOut attack to extract the sealing key and in turn
the machine’s attestation key from the Intel provided Quoting
Enclave. This key could be used to forge attestation quotes.
CrossTalk [41] extends the MDS techniques to show that
enclaves can be attacked even across different execution units
(i.e. cross core). An otherwise good mitigation strategy is
to isolate execution of sensitive operation to CPU cores not
shared with untrusted threads. CrossTalk achieves this by
managing to sample the so called staging buffer which is an
undocumented component on modern Intel CPUs, shared be-
tween all cores. The paper demonstrates the attack by showing
how snooping on the output from the rdrand instructions can
be used to extract a ECDSA private key from a SGX enclave
running on an separate core.
G. Software-based Fault Injection Attacks [44]
In 2017 the CLKscrew [43] by Tang et al. attacked
ARM TrustZone by adjusting the dynamic frequency scaling,
6at least in part, although the authors speculate on other sources of the
leakage as well
through a privileged and model-specific interface (used by
system software for dynamic overclocking). This attack does
not affect Intel SGX since it is specific to ARM based
systems, but recently Murdock et al. published the Plundervolt
attack [44] which does affect SGX.
The Plundervolt attack abuses privileged interfaces for dy-
namic voltage scaling on the x86 CPU in order to reliably
corrupt enclave computations. The authors write “Using this
interface to very briefly decrease the CPU voltage during a
computation in a victim SGX enclave, we show that a privi-
leged adversary is able to inject faults into protected enclave
computations”. The authors then proceeds to demonstrate how
this attack can be used to “reconstruct full cryptographic keys
with negligible computational effort”. [44]
The SGX-Bomb [2] and RowHammer [3], [4] hardware
bugs mentioned earlier would also fit in this category, if denial
of service attacks had not been placed out of scope for this
article.
IV. DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES AND MITIGATIONS
In this section, we present the most relevant published
mitigation techniques for the presented attacks and place
each into the categories: Microcode patch, System design,
Compiler/SDK and Application design.
Defences that are out of scope: This survey does not
account for purely theoretical defenses and mitigations which
relies on changes to hardware and ISA. Some examples are
Sanctum [45] and Autarky [46] which both proposes changes
to the hardware and ISA.
A. Microcode patch
A CPU is not fully realized in hardware but rather most of
the more complex instructions are implemented by a form of
low-level software called microcode. The microcode can only
be changed by the manufacturer of the CPU, in this case Intel.
A microcode patch can thus make direct changes in how the
CPU performs its duties, and these patches are usually the
most effective way to mitigate any vulnerability.
B. System design
Some attacks cannot easily be thwarted by microcode
patches but may instead be fixed by redesigning or removing
implementation issues of the supporting systems. For example,
Intel provides a number of special enclaves to support higher
level services such as the Launcher Enclave (LE), Provisioning
Enclave (PE) and Quoting Enclave (QE).
Some microcode patches include new information of the
running system, which the attestation services and supporting
enclaves must act upon, or otherwise include in the attestation
reports [47].
C. Compiler/SDK
In some cases Intel does not appear to provide any solutions
or mitigations for attacks, but leaves the responsibility up to
the enclave authors themselves. In this case the best one can
hope for is for some kind of general approach implemented
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Controlled-Channel [9] sec. III-A    # # # # # # #  [52]  [55]
Stealthy Page Table [10] sec. III-A    # # # # # # #  [52] #
SGX-Step [11] sec. III-A  #    # # # # #  [11][48] #
Nemesis [12] sec. III-A   # #  # # # # #  [50] #
Off Limits [13] sec. III-A    G# # G# # #  [13] # #  [13]
Leaky Cauldron [14] sec. III-B    # #  # # # #  [50][51] #
CacheZoom [20] sec. III-B   # # #  # # # #  [50][51]  [56]
Cache Attacks on SGX [21] sec. III-B   # # #  # # # # #  [56]
Malware Guard Extensions [22] sec. III-B   # # #  # # #  [22] # #
Software Grand Exposure [23] sec. III-B   # # #  # # # # #  [23]
CacheQuote [24] sec. III-B   # # #  # # #  [24] # #
MemJam [25] sec. III-B #  # # #  # # # #  [49] #
Branch Shadowing [26] sec. III-C   #  # # # # # #  [26][48] #
BranchScope [27] sec. III-C #  #  # # # # # #  [27][48] #
Bluethunder [28] sec. III-C   #  # # # # # #  [28] #
SgxPectre [31] sec. III-D   # # # #  #  [47] # # #
SpectreRSB [32] sec. III-D #  # # # #  # # # #  [32]
Spectre v1 [33] sec. III-D #  # # # #  #  [47] # # #
Foreshadow-SGX [34] sec. III-E  # # # # #  #  [35] # # #
RIDL [38] sec. III-F #  # # # #  #  [38] # # #
ZombieLoad [39] sec. III-F #  # # # #  #  [39] # # #
CacheOut [40] sec. III-F   # # # #  # G#[40] # # #
CrossTalk [41] sec. III-F  # # # # #  #  [41] # # #
Plundervolt [44] sec. III-G  G# # # # # #   [44] # # #
in either the compiler or in the enclave SDK. By going in
this direction its use is, in theory, transparent to the enclave
developer. That-is, if they elect to opt-in to the techniques
and their various performance impacts and drawbacks. In this
section, we will explore some known solutions that strive to
fit in this category.
Lee et al. [26] proposed ZigZagger as a defence against
their own branch shadowing attack. It works by transforming
conditional branches into unconditional jumps to intermediate
code sections (called trampolines) that in-turn bounces to the
target code. Hosseinzadeh et al. [48] later improves upon this
idea by doing control flow randomization at run-time. Both
of these schemes were implemented as compiler extensions
on top of LLVM. Meanwhile Chen et al. presents a solution
also implemented in LLVM that closes HT (Hyper-Threading)
based side-channels [49] by blocking access to sibling cores
via the creation of a shadow thread7.
Shih et al. presented a modified LLVM compiler dubbed
T-SGX [50] which terminates the execution of sensitive oper-
ations using Intel’s Transactional Synchronization Extensions,
TSX, if a certain number of interrupts occurs. T-SGX is
claimed to be effective against all known controlled channel
7Previously it would not help to disable Hyper-Threading since its status
was not included in the attestation reports. But with the introduction of the
Foreshadow mitigations, disabling HT in BIOS would now appear to be a
more secure alternative.
7attacks. “De´ja` Vu” is an alternative solution proposed by Chen
et al. in [51] which implements a clock-thread protected with
TSX by which it can be detected if the run-time of the program
differs significantly from what is expected. If it does, it is
assumed that the protected code has been interrupted and De´ja`
Vu will therefore abort the execution.
Strackx et al. presented the “Heisenberg Defence” [52] as
an alternative. It also utilizes TSX transactions, but by adding
preloading and verifications it can proactively protect sensitive
code against page-table based controlled channel attacks. For
systems without TSX support, SGX-LAPD was proposed by
Fu et al. in [53] using a detection based approached similar
to T-SGX but instead implemented using large pages.
To defeat enclave specific attacks such as, for example,
ROP attacks (which remain out of scope for this paper) Seo et
al. [54] found a way to activate ASLR inside SGX enclaves,
to make exploitation more difficult. It is implemented on top
of the LLVM compiler.
D. Application design
If all else fails, the enclave’s author must take care to design
their enclaves in a secure and side-channel protected manner.
In this section we discuss some of the published tools and
techniques that have been proposed to help with this.
Shinde et al. suggest a compiler assisted solution to remove
data dependent memory accesses [55] in order to mitigate
page-fault based side channels by aiming to keep secret data
and code within the same page. Cloak is a software library
developed by Gruss et al. in [56] that allows secret data and
secret handling code to be wrapped in a TSX transaction. It
seems to be quite effective at preventing cache-based side-
channels.
An alternative solution is to introduce random noise in
the applications algorithms by adding accesses to dummy
data. Chandra et al. explores this possibility in [57]. The
same effect can be more thoroughly obtained by the use of
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) constructions with data oblivious
execution to hide memory accesses in such a way that none-of
the above mentioned side-channel attacks would be effective.
ZeroTrace [58] introduced by Sasy et al. is one such scheme
for use in SGX enclaves.
V. DISCUSSION ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF MITIGATIONS
In table I, we have compiled a matrix that summarizes a
number of properties for each attack, including the current
state of mitigations, to the best of our knowledge.
As discussed earlier, the mitigation techniques are divided
into four categories: Microcode patch, System design, Com-
piler/SDK and Application design. As it can be seen in
Table I, almost all categorized attacks are mitigated or partially
mitigated by these techniques.
Usually, the mitigation techniques for attacks in the same
category are similar to each other. For instance, Controlled
Channel Attacks [9]–[14] and Branch Prediction Attacks [26]–
[28] can be mitigated using Compiler/SDK techniques or
modifying the Application design.
The Cache-attacks [20]–[25] are explicitly outside the scope
of the Intel threat-model. This, in combination with the fact
that these attack are very specific for each targeted enclave
implementation is the reason why one would be forced to make
enclave specific mitigations (i.e. modifying the application
design). In the case of the cache attack in [24], since it directly
attacks part of the attestation service, the only viable option is
for Intel to update the affected enclaves. At this time we have
found no indication whether or not this has been done.
Most of the Speculative Execution Attacks, Rogue Data
Cache Loads, MDS Attacks, and Software-based Fault In-
jection Attacks are mitigated using Microcode patch. This
is the case for the 32-bit memory segmentation attack “Off-
Limits” in [13], SgxPectre [31], Foreshadow [34], Foresha-
dow-NG [35] and PlunderVolt [44]. In a few instances the
mitigation is in combination with updates to Intel provided
attestation services [47].
While many of these mitigations appear to be quite effective,
in practice some of them impose additional requirements
on the system. For example, part of the mitigation strategy
against Foreshadow would be to disable Hyper-Threading
(HT) (logical cores share the same L1 cache) and for this
reason the status of HT is included during attestation and seal-
ing operations. These mitigations have been supplied through
microcode-updates.
Koruyeh et al. mentions in SpectreRSB paper [32] that the
microcode patch “RSB-refilling” is not specifically applied
for SGX enclaves. Based on this we draw the conclusion
that RSB-refilling ought to be implemented either the SDKs
or compilers, if they wish to ensure protection against the
SpectreRSB. We have been unable find any information on
whether or not this or some other equivalent mitigation is
implemented in the available SDKs. Alternatively, the enclave
authors might wish to add this protection manually (this is
shown in the table under the “Application Design” mitigation
strategy).
For most MDS type of attacks, [38], [39] Intel microcode-
patches had been already released, but for a more recent
attack of this type called CacheOut [40] the update patch
had not yet been released, at the time of this writing. Intel
has promised [40] that the patch will be released in the near
future. Until then, we mark this attack as partially mitigated
in Table I.
The BIOS patch and microcode updates which mitigates
PlunderVolt works by disabling much of the dynamic voltage
scaling interface as well as recording and verifying the status
of these interfaces into its sealing and attestation operations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We found more than 20 attacks in the literature using side
channels and active attackers, see Table I. For all of the attacks
there are mitigation strategies, however some are more feasible
in practice than others. Especially those mitigations which are
based on a correct application design might, in practice, be
difficult to implement completely.
The number of side channel attacks targeting SGX found
recently hint that there might be more attacks not yet discov-
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ered. This should also be considered when evaluating if and
how to employ Intel SGX as a protection mechanism.
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